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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, there has been a surge of environmental awareness, which has
spawned the rapid development of environmental law. In many countries, the environment is
a sensitive and vital area where substantial economic interests are at stake. A clean and safe
environment and its protection is a common concern for both agricultural countries because
they need clean land and industrial countries because they produce large amounts of waste.
In the United States, environmental law has been developed rapidly in the last few years.
There are many social, political and economic reasons for this rapid expansion. Rising public
concern and need to protect national interests - almost one third of U.S. land is pubhc
property^ - spurred the lawmakers to act in the area. Congress has enacted numerous statutes
and empowered federal agencies, primarily the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to
adopt standards and enforce the laws.
The effect of this development of environmental law on the private sector has been
spectacular because of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA).^ A decade ago, environmental liability was not a major concern of
U.S. businesses and was rarely dealt with in commercial contracts. In the past ten years,
however, the situation has changed drastically. It is not uncommon now for companies or
^See Turner T. Smith, Jr. and Pascale Kromarek, Understanding US and European
Environmental Law - A Practitioner's Guide, Graham & Trotman Nijhoff, 1989, p. 1.
^See infra, note 13.
2even individuals to be faced with cleanup costs of hundreds of millions of dollars.' As a
result, companies now devote significant resources dealing with environmental problems,
which has created a whole sub-industry of specialists in the field, including lawyers,
consultants, engineers and lobbyists.
In the European Union ("EU"), environmental law has evolved at a slower pace. At
present, European countries have adopted some environmental legislation, but on the
European Union level, legislation and environmental action do not move very fast because
ofthe particular structure and complicated legislative procedure of the EU. However, with
the adoption of the Single European Act ("SEA") in 1987,"* and the new Maastricht Treaty
in 1993,^ environmental concerns have become a priority of the EU. In fact, the SEA and the
Maastricht Treaty include provisions dealing specifically with the environment.
As environmental legislation is adopted in Europe, Europeans or companies operating in
Europe will soon be facing the same kind of problems that have arisen in the United States.
For example, the U.S. legislation on civil liability for damage caused by environmental waste
presents four general categories of potential responsible persons ("PRP"s). The U.S. courts,
interpreting the legislation and the Congressional intent, have tried to specify who these
persons are. They have gone far away in their interpretation and have found liability in not
only owners and operators but also stockholders and lending institutions as well. In order to
avoid vivid reactions of the business people and the insurance companies as well as the
conflicting courts' opinions, the EU should be clear and specific in the different categories of
PRP's in the much discussed and recently proposed legislation in the field.
^For a complete analysis of the mechanism and the cost for a cleanup operation,
see, William N. Hedeman, Jonathan Z. Cannon and David M. Friedland, Superfund
Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective On the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 ELR
10413 (July 1991).
'*For a more detailed analysis, see, part III, section A.
'Id.
3Since the United States adopted environmental laws ahead of the Europeans, the US laws
and the experience gained from their enforcement, both by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and in the courts, furnish a valuable model.
This thesis examines the impact of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the act that regulates the hazardous waste
liability in the United States and the resulting problems from its application that the European
Union's legislators should seriously consider before adopting a European counterpart to
CERCLA, which is currently under consideration. Part I gives a brief overview of US
environmental law and discusses CERCLA in some detail. Part II analyzes relevant US court
decisions interpreting CERCLA and defining the categories of persons who may be held
liable. Part III discusses the early development of European environmental law. Part IV
discusses the proposed European Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste and
its scope as well as the Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage Finally, Part V
examines the aspects of the U.S. experience that would seem particularly relevant for
European legislators should consider in order to avoid some of the problems and pitiful results
from the U.S. legislation.
I. FRAMEWORK OF U.S. LEGISLATION
A. Overview of the U.S. Environmental Law
As early as 1899, U.S. lawmakers adopted laws related to the environment.^ Starting in
the late 1960's, a groundswell of public concern over the environment surfaced' and
politicians responded. In 1970, the Council on Environmental Quality, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency were
established,* and Congress enacted the first of a series of statutes designed to protect the
environment: the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),^ and the Clean Air Act^.''
Other statutes would soon follow: the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water
Act)" in 1972, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)'^ in 1976 and, in 1980,
''See, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1988, ch. 425, par. 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152
(codified at 33 U.S.C. 407 (1988). The Act forbade disposing of refuse matter of any
kind into navigable waters.
'On April 22, 1970, Americans celebrated the first "Earth Day" with massive
demonstrations around the United States, presentations of environmental education
programs and congressional environmental rallies across the country.
^See, G. Alan Perkins, Lender Liability Under CERCLA Deserves More Than A
Fleeting Glance, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 208, (1991).
^NEPA, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 652 (1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. s4321(1988).
"Pub. L. No 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ss
7401-7642(1988).
"Pub. L. No 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. ss 1251-
1387(1988).
"Pub. L. No 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ss
6901-6992(1988).
5the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).'^
The first four statutes are primarily regulatory whereas CERCLA is primarily remedial.
It is designed to correct existing environmental damage, by creating mandatory cleanup and
to prevent any future problem caused by hazardous waste. This section will treat the first
three statutes since they are essential part of the US environmental legislation and the
following section will treat RCRA and CERCLA since they deal with civil liability issues.
1. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Enacted in late 1969, the NEPA established the public policy underpinning for
environmental laws by requiring that all federal agencies consider the environmental impact
of their actions. The central provision of NEPA requires the filing of an Environmental
Impact Statement for any major federal action that substantially affects the environment.
2. Clean Air Act
The federal Clean Air Act was enacted in 1 970, and significantly amended in 1 977 and in
1990. The 1970 Act created a pervasive air pollution control regulatory system which was
based primarily on health protection, and which required many industries to meet national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) through emission limits established in State
Implementation Programs.
The 1977 amendments added: (a) special provisions for areas with air cleaner than national
standards, the Prevention of the Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions, and (b) strict
provisions for "nonattainment" areas, i.e. those areas failing to meet NAAQS.
"Pub. L. No. 99-499, 101 et seq., 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
6The 1990 amendments (a) substantially revised the nonattainment provisions, (b) created
a complicated new technology-based control program for toxic air pollutants, (c) added new
provisions focusing on acid rain and the power plant emissions thought to be its major cause,
(d) incorporated provisions intended to protect the ozone layer through mandating the phase-
out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and (e) strengthened enforcement powers.
The Clean Air Act established a national policy "to preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States and local government in controlling air pollution."
It gave the Surgeon General authority to conduct investigations as well as to offer solutions
to various air pollution problems. The Clean Air Act also appropriated up to $5 million to
carry out these policies, to conduct research and training, and to award state and local grants
to pollution control agencies and institutions.
Prior to the enactment ofCERCLA the only federal statutory provisions prior to CERCLA
who imposed liability on certain parties for pollution clean-up are section 3 1 1 of the Clean
Water Act^'* and the RCRA's "imminent hazard" provision. ^^
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act)
a. Overview
In 1972, Congress enacted the basic framework legislation for federal water pollution
control regulation, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now called the Clean Water Act
(CWA), as well as the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA). The
basic elements of the CWA regulatory program are:
- Water quality standards;
"FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. s. 1321.
''RCRA, 42 U.S.C. s. 6973(a).
7- Minimum national effluent limitations for specific industries;
- A discharge permit program through which these effluent limits and water quality
standards are translated into binding limitations on individual discharges;
- A program for construction grants (now loans) for publicly-owned treatment works
(POTW).
In 1977, Congress amended the CWA in an effort to focus technology-based standards
more effectively to control toxic pollutants. In 1987, Congress passed extensive amendments
designed to achieve the improvement ofwater quality in areas where compliance with national
minimum discharge limits was inadequate in order to ensure that quality goals were met. The
MPRSA has also been amended several times, most recently in 1988, so as effectively to
prohibit offshore dumping of industrial wastes and sewage sludge.
The goal of the Clean Water Act is to restore and maintain the physical, chemical and
biological integrity of national waters. The Clean Water Act established a national policy to
prohibit deadly discharges oftoxic pollutants and assure adequate statewide pollution control,
and to eliminate toxic discharges by 1985.^^
In 1990^^ Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act, which (a) substantially revised the
CWA's proscriptions on oil and hazardous substance discharges, (b) created a one
billion-dollar clean-up fund, (c) made vessel personnel and equipment standards for oil
transport and storage more rigorous, and (d) strengthened government removal authority and
civil and criminal penalties.
'^3 U.S.C. par. 1251 etseq. See also, Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912
F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990) (objective of the Act is to restore and maintain integrity of
nation's water).
' 33U.S.C. par. 1251 etseq. See also. Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912
F. 2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990) (objective of the Act is to restore and maintain integrity
of nation's water.)
b. Potentially Responsible Persons (PRP)
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act -the oil spill section-establishes strict liability for the
"owner and operator"'* of a vessel or facility discharging oil or hazardous substances into
navigable waters of the United States. The same persons are also responsible for cleanup
costs'^ and are subject to civil penalties.^"
However, unlike CERCLA, liability under section 3 11 of the Clean Water Act has only
prospective application. The Clean Water Act does not cover discharges which occurred
prior to passage of section 311. Furthermore, although liability under section 3 1 1 is strict,
interpreting courts generally require a showing of proximate cause on the part of the owner
or operator before liability attaches.^'
B. Environmental Hazardous Waste Laws in the U.S.
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
a. Overview
RCRA was enacted with the goal of promoting the protection of the environment and
human health as well as to encourage conservation of natural resources. ^^ RCRA established
"FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. s 1321 (a) (6).
'^FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. s 1321 (f); See e.g. United States v. West of Eng. Ship
Owner's Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 872 F.2d 1 192 (5th Cir. 1989).
'"FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. s 1321 (b) (6); See e.g. United States v. New York, 481 F.
Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd without opinion, 614 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 446
U.S. 936.
^'Perkins, supra note 8.
^^See supra note 12.
9a comprehensive regulatory scheme for hazardous waste.^ It also governs the management
of hazardous waste from generation to disposal. RCRA's purpose is to avoid further
contamination ofthe environment by preventing the creation of new hazardous waste sites. ^^
b. Potentially Responsible Persons (PRP)
Under RCRA, responsible parties are defined as "any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility. "^^ In order for a party to be liable for cleanup costs, the party must have "contributed
to" the activities which caused the contamination.'^^
(i) Generators
Under RCRA a "generator is any person, whose act or process produces hazardous waste
identified or listed [by the regulations] as hazardous or whose act first causes hazardous waste
^^See H.R. REP. NO. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 61 19, 6120. See also United States v. Aceto
Agricultural Chems Corp., 872 F. 2d 1373, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1989) (Act attempted to deal
with general disposal of wastes, to provide "cradle to grave regulatory regime").
^^Susan M. King, Lender's Liability For Cleanup Costs , 18 ENT'L L. 241, (1988).
''RCRA, 42 U.S.C. s 6973 (a).
26Id
10
to become subject to regulation. "^^ Generators to whom RCRA originally applied were (and
still are) required to: (i) identify and record the amount of hazardous waste they generated,
(ii) label any containers used to transport, store, or dispose of hazardous waste;^* (iii) furnish
information on the chemical composition of their hazardous waste to persons transporting,
treating, storing, or disposing of their waste, (iv) use a manifest system^^ to track the
hazardous waste until it reaches the designated hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal (TSD) facility; and (v) submit periodic reports to the EPA administration.^"
Generators could not treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste without an identification
number assigned by the EPA. Generators could not accumulate and store hazardous waste
for more than ninety days without obtaining a storage permit. To do so subjected a generator
to the exceedingly complex regulations governing "owners and operators" of the TSD
facilities.^^ In short, generators of over 1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste (large generas)
had to contend with an expansive and cumbersome body of detailed regulations.^^
^'40 C.F.R. s 260.10 (definition of a generator); see also, 42 U.S.C. ss 6921 (d),
6922 (1984) (defining small quantity generators and setting generator standards,
respectively).
A person is "any individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including
a government corporation), partnership, association, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. s 6903 (15) (1982).
See also. King, supra note 24.
'M2 U.S.C. s 6922 (1982).
^42 U.S.C. s 6903 (12) (defining "manifest" as the form used to identify hazardous
waste and to track its movement from the point of generation to the point of disposal). See
also, 40 C.F.R. ss 260.10, 262.20, 262.23 (1987).
'"42 U.S.C. s 6922 (1982).
^'See, 40 C.F.R. ss 262.34, 264, 265 (1987).
^'^See, King supra 24.
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Most of these regulations still apply today. In 1984, however. Congress substantially
amended RCRA to fill perceived gaps in the statute and its accompanying regulations " The
regulations are now broader and stricter. For example, manifests must now certify that the
generator has in place a program for reducing hazardous waste generation and that the TSD
method used is one which minimizes any threat to human health and the environment.^'*
Copies of the manifest must be provided to all persons who will transport, treat, store, or,
dispose of the hazardous waste and the copies must be retained for three years. ^^ All
containers of hazardous waste must be labeled, marked, and placarded according to
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations.^^ Generators must submit biennial reports
to the EPA administrator, and the content of such reports must conform to DOT
regulations.^^
The 1984 amendments also eliminated the RCRA exclusion for generators of less than
1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste per month. ^* An estimated ninety percent of all
generators fell within the original exclusion (although the ten percent of generators originally
included accounted for ninety percent of the hazardous waste produced). ^^ Nevertheless,
RCRA now applies to "small-quantity generators'"*" those producing between 100 and 1,000
''42 U.S.c. s 6922 (b) (1982 and Supp. Ill 1985).
"40 C.F.R. s 262.20-262.22 (1987).
'Mo C.F.R. s 263.10; DOT regulations are at 49 C.F.R. ss 171-179 (1987).
"42 U.S.C. s 6922 (a) (6) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985).
^^See, King supra note 24.
'^Mquoting an interview with William F. Funk, Prof, of Law, Northwestern School
of Law, Lewis Clark College (Oct. 10, 1986).
^40 C.F.R. s 260.10 (1987).
12
kilograms of hazardous waste per month/" RCRA regulations for small quantity generators
are less stringent than those for large generators, but only as for manifesting, reporting, and
labeling requirements/^
Cu) Transporters
RCRA also applies to transporters of hazardous waste Z*^ A transporter is any person
"engaged in the offsite transportation of hazardous waste by air, rail, highway, or water. "'*^
Under RCRA regulations transporters, like generators, must obtain EPA identification
numbers.*^ A transporter who stores hazardous waste for more than ten days becomes
subject to regulation as an owner or operator of a TSD facility and"*^ must obtain a storage
permit/*^ Transporters must comply with the manifest syslfem by refusing to accept
hazardous waste unless it is accompanied by a manifest, by providing copies of the manifest
to all appropriate persons, and by retaining copies of the manifest for three years.
^'42 U.S.C. s 6921 (d) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). Generators of less than 100
kilograms per month are "conditionally exempt small quantity generators" and are not
subject to the regulations at 40 C.F.r. ss 262-266, provided they comply with 40 C.F.R.
s 260.15 (f),(g),G).
'^'^See King supra note 24.
^'42 U.S.C. s 6923 (1982).
^40 C.F.R.s 260.10 (1987) (definition of the transportation).
^•'40 C.F.R. s 260. 11 (1987).
"^40 C.F.R. s 263.12 (1987).
40 C.F.R. ss 264, 265, 270 (1987). Owners and operators are subject to operating
method, design, location, construction, and monitoring requirements and must obtain EPA
permits. See generally, 40 C.F.R. ss 262 (Generators), 263 (Transporters), 264-65 (Owners
and Operators) (1987).
4840 C.F.R.S 263.20-263.22 (1987) and also 262.34, 264, 265 (1987).
13
Transporters must also abide by extensive notice and reporting requirements in the event of
a hazardous waste discharge during transportation/*''
(iii). Owners and Operators
The 1984 amendment ofRCRA substantially changed the standards applicable to owners
and operators ofTSD facilities^' Regulations are now extremely detailed with respect to: (i)
maintaining records of all hazardous waste treated, stored or disposed, (ii) reporting,
monitoring, inspecting, and complying with the manifest system; (iii) treating, storing, and
disposing of hazardous waste pursuant to methods, techniques, and practices satisfactory to
EPA; (iv) locating, designing, and constructing TSD facilities; (v) maintaining contingency
plans for effective action to minimize unanticipated damage from hazardous waste, (vi)
qualifying for ownership, operation, personnel training, security, and, financial responsibility,
and, (vii) complying with all permit requirements.
c. Sanctions
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provides for civil penalties as well as
criminal sanctions There is up to $25,000 a day fine for noncompliance with RCRA's
regulations." For intentional violations the Act provides criminal sanctions -up to two years
'Mo C.F.R. s 263.30-263.31 (1987).
'"42 U.S.C. s 6924 (1982); 40 C.F.R. s 264 (1987). Transporter, disposal, and
facility are each defined separately. 40 C.F.R. s 260.10 (1987). TSD facilities are referred
to generically to mean hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility. 42 U.S.C.
s 6924 (1982). Owner means the person who owns all or part of the facility. 40 C.F.R. s
260.10 (1987). Operator means the person responsible for the overall operation of a
facility. Id.
" 42 U.S.C. s 6928 (a) (3), (g) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985).
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in prison and fines -up to $50,000-^^ There are also more severe criminal sanctions and fines
-up to fifteen years in prison, $250,00 or both- for intentional violations by a person who
ioiows such violations may place another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm." As for corporations, fines can be as much as $1,000,000.*" In addition to criminal
sanctions and fines, RCRA provides for temporary and permanent injunctive relief**
Injunctions are used most often to compel compliance but in very serious situations may be
used to shut down a business entirely.*^
d. Observations
RCRA may have several effects on businesses. First, the cost of compliance with RCRA
and its regulations may be substantial for businesses.*^ Lenders must take these costs in credit
analyses of potential borrowers whose businesses generate or handle hazardous substances.
The additional collateral and higher costs may provoke serious problems in businesses needing
financial support.
"42 U.S.C. s 6928 (d) (1982); see also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. 741
F. 2nd 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
*' 42 U.S.C. s 6928 (e) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985).
'Ud.
42 U.S.C. s 6928 (a). See also. Environmental Defense Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.
2d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 1983).
^^ See, King supra note 24.
" See King supra note 24 quoting a telephone interview with William L. Law,
President, Cudahy Tannery, Cudahy, Wisconsin (Jan. 18, 1988). Mr. Law's company, which
has about $20 million in annual sales, pays approximately $400,000 each year just for its
sewer bill and, absent environmental requirements, the net profit would be about thirty
percent higher. These costs, he observed, are passed on to the consumer and, of course, bear
upon the ability of domestic companies to compete internationally.
15
Second, the potential for noncompliance (intentional and unintentional) increased as RCRA
and its regulations expanded their coverage and increased in complexity.^*
For secured lenders, such as financial institutions, there are several considerations. On one
hand, RCRA's fines may a£fect the ability of businesses carrying dept to repay loans. On the
other hand, if foreclosure takes place, RCRA allows the EPA the right to seek enforcement
actions against any person contributing to the past or present handling of hazardous waste;
EPA need only establish that the past or present activities with respect to such waste may
present an imminent and substantial danger to health or the environment to pursue
enforcement action. ^^
Finally, RCRA, unlike CERCLA, fails to define the terms "owner" and "operator"^" and
RCRA's regulations contain only imperceptive definitions.^' An "owner" is "the person who
owns a facility or part of a facility" and an "operator" is "the person responsible for the overall
operation ofthe facility."" The definitions do not include the "innocent landowner defense"
for a person who holds "indicia of ownership" to protect a security interest."
^^ See King supra note 24.
'' 42 U.S.C. s 6928 (a) (1) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985); 42 U.S.C. s 9606 (a) (1982).
'" 42 U.S.C.s 6903 (1982).
^' 40 C.F.R. 8 260.10(1987).
''Id.
63 SARA, 42 U.S.C. s 9601 (35) (West Supp.1987).
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2. Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and Liability Act
(CERChA)
a. Overview
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to "provide a comprehensive scheme for responding
to the problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.""
CERCLA was explicitly designed to fill the "important regulatory gaps"^^ left by RCRA,
particularly with respect to inactive, abandoned, or unauthorized hazardous waste sites.
^
Besides establishing procedures for the cleanup of the inactive and abandoned hazardous
waste sites, CERCLA provides funding for the cleanup, and authorizes the EPA to mandate
and undertake the cleanup. CERCLA also seeks to protect the public health by ensuring
quick responses to the threats posed by improperly managed hazardous waste sites by
encouraging the voluntary cleanup ofthose sites, and by making certain that those responsible
bear the costs of cleanup. Section 104 of CERCLA authorizes the federal government to
""United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 20, 879, 20 880 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 27, 1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 61 19, 6125).
CERCLA was designed to remedy inadequate laws and widespread use of unsafe
disposal methods which presented a substantial danger to the environment and major health
risk to humanity. See HR Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong, & Admin. News 6119, 6120. The four major goals for the government as
outlined in the legislation are: 1) to create an inventory of the country's hazardous waste
sites, 2) prioritize the inventory based on the relative danger of each site, 3) contain the
dangerous releases from these sites, and 4) to establish a funding program to clean up all the
hazardous waste sites. /J at 61 19.
"^Perkins, supra note 8.
^CERCLA's provisions apply to hazardous substances, not just hazardous waste as
defined under RCRA. See e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. ss 9601 (14), 9607 (a) (1982 & West Supp. Ill
1985). The term "hazardous substances" includes hundreds of materials that do not fall
within the term "hazardous waste," 42 U.S.C.A. s 9601 (14) (1982 & West Supp. Ill 1985).
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respond to the release^^ of a hazardous substance^* or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment by taking any action "necessary to protect the public health
or welfare of the environment."^^
Its National Contingency Plan (NCP) provides for the investigation, evaluation, and
selection of the appropriate action in response to actual or threatened releases of hazardous
wasted"
^^Section 101(22) ofCERCLA defines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into environment (including the abandonment or discharging of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant)..."CERCLA 101(22), 42 U.S.C. 9601(22) (Supp. V 1987).
^^Under section 101(14) ofCERCLA "hazardous substance" include a large number
of materials regulated under other federal environmental statutes such as: section
311(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.
1321(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. 6921 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); toxic pollutants listed under section 307(a) of the
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 1317(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987); hazardous air pollutants listed under
section 1 12 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412 (1982); and hazardous substances that are
regulated under section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2606 (1988). See,
42 U.S.C. 9601(14) (Supp. V 1982).
''CERCLA 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V. 1987). A removal action is
an immediate action taken to "prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of
release." CERCLA 101(23), 42 U.S.C. 9601(23) (Supp. V 1987). Removal actions include
providing fencing to limit access to the hazardous waste site, furnishing alternative water
supplies and temporarily evacuating potentially affected individuals. Id. In contrast, a
remedial action is a permanent remedy designed "to prevent or minimize the release of
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare or the environment." CERCLA 101(24), 42 U.S.C. 9601(24)
(Supp. V 1987) Remedial actions include containing hazardous wastes within earthen dikes
and then capping the waste site with a clay cover. Id.
'"42 U.S.C. s 9605 (1982) as amended by SARA s 105, 42 U.S.C.A. s 9605 (West
Supp. 1987); 40 C.F.R. pt 300 (1987).
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In order to pay for these government response actions, CERCLA established the
Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund or, as it is commonly known, "Superfund"/" If
the federal government taps the Superflind to pay for a response action, it may then sue the
potential responsible parties (PRP) to recover its costs. To carry out these goals. Congress
cast a broad liability net.
Courts have criticized CERCLA for poor drafting and vague provisions. ^^ Despite the
statute's three-year legislative process, its legislative history does not provide much help in
CERCLA's interpretation. Strangely enough such an important legislative act passed with last
minute changes and compromises so that the final version of the bill has little recorded
legislative history and no full committee report. ^^
"CERCLA 221, 42 U.S.C. 963 l(b)(2)( 1982). Congress originally approved $1.6
billion for the Superftmd. Of this amount, 87.5% came from a special tax on petroleum and
other chemicals, see 42 U.S.C. 9631(b)(2) (1982) (repealed 1986). The Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
[hereinafter SARA], significantly expanded the Superfund in 1986, making $8.5 billion
available to fund response actions undertaken during the five years ending in 1991. See
Superflind Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 501-531, 100 Stat.1613, 1760-1782
(1986).
^"^"CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by
vague terminology and deleted provisions" which almost places courts in the "undesirable
and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n. 15 (W.D. Mo. 1984),
modified, 810 F. 2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also United
States V. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 109 (D.N.J. 1983), United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983), United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1 100,
11 1 1 (D. Minn. 1982) and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
578 (D. Md. 1986) (noting difficulties in applying CERCLA).
Grad, A Legislative History Of The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. Envtl L. 1 (1980).
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CERCLA originally was to have expired September 30, 1991, but Congress reauthorized
CERCLA through the end of fiscal year 1994, the Trust Fund was extended through
December 31, 1995.''*
b. Liability under CERCLA
(i) Key Provisions
CERCLA extends liability to four classes ofPRPs:
1) current owners or operators of a vessel or a hazardous waste site,
2) persons who had owned or operated the site at the time the disposal occurred,
3) generators of hazardous waste who arranged for treatment or disposal of their waste
at their site, and
4) transporters of hazardous waste to a site fi^om which there is a release or threatened
'^Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, @6301, 104
Stat. 1388-455(1990)..
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release/*
The statute only allows very limited defenses. To avoid liability, a PRP must prove that
contamination was caused by:
1) an act of God,
2) an act of war, or
3) an act or omission of a third party other than employee of the PRP or anyone with
which the PRP has a contractual relationship.'^
'^42 U.S.C. 9607 (a) (1988). The text of the statute reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defense set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of a disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title. Id.
'^is is called the "innocent landowner" or "third party" defense. See CERCLA
,
42
U.S.C. 9607 (b).
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To establish these defenses, the PRP must prove that he exercised due diligence and took
precautions to prevent foreseeable misconduct of a third party /'^ CERCLA, as amended in
1988, expressly recognizes the "innocent purchaser" defense if the purchaser of a
contaminated facility "did not know and had no reason to know" of the hazardous waste
despite "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property
consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability."^*
It also exempts from the definition of "owner or operator" the persons who, without
participating in the management of the facility, hold indicia of ownership in the facility
primarily to protect their security interests^^ However, CERCLA does not specifically
mention shareholders, parent corporations, directors and officers, suppliers, lenders, trustees
and other controlling persons, and customers of corporations.*"
The law gives a definition ofPRPs which the courts have interpreted very broadly. A PRP
may not seek court reliefwhile the government is cleaning up the site with money drawn from
the Superfund, but must wait until the government has completed all of the work.*'
^^Id. at 9607 (b) (3). See also, Missouri V. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 610 F.
Supp. 4,5 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (defense not available to generator although his contract with the
transporter expressly provided that waste would be disposed in a different site).
'M2U.S.C. 9601(35X1988).
'SeeAl U.S.C. 9601 (20)(A) (1988).
79
^\\ contrast, where the Congress wanted the controlling persons to be directly liable,
it said so. See e.g., Securities Act of 1933, par. 15, 15 U.S.C. 770 (1988).
81CERCLA 1 13(h), 42 U.S.C. 9613(1) (Supp. V 1987).
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(ii). Standard of Liability
Although CERCLA expressly defines those who may be liable persons, it fails to establish
the standard of liability.*^ Thus, the courts have been required to establish the standard of
liability, strict,*^ joint and several,*'* and retroactive*^ liability.
^^For an extensive analysis see also John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental
Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C.L.Rev. 765, 777 (1990); Lewis M. Barr , CERCLA Made
Simple; An Analysis of the Cases under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 45 BUS. LAW 923, 976 (1990); Roger J. Marzulla and
Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 41 S.C.L.Rev. 705, 708 (1990); G. Alan Perkins, Lender
Liability under CERCLA Deserves More Than a Fleeting Glance, 13 U.ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. 1209(1991).
"United States v. Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 879, 20, 881 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (holding that, except for three limited defenses, CERCLA imposes strict
liability upon responsible parties "without regard to the defendant's culpability or state of
mind"); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that "Most cases have imposed strict liability...under
CERCLA"), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly
liable" ). See also, EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured
Creditor Exemption of CERCLA (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.) (proposed Sept. 14,
1990),ENVT'L REP. (BNA) No 21, at 1162.
*'*CERCLA does not expressly provide for joint and several liability. Instead, such
liability "may be imposed through a case-to-case application of federal common law
principles." Bliss, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20, 883; United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.,
619 F. Supp. 162, 191, 198-99 (D.C. Mo. 1985) Ooint and several liability applies to
CERCLA); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1401 (D.N.H. 1985)
(same); United States v. Chem. Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (illegal
discharger is jointly and severally liable).
85
United States v. Monsanto, 858 F. 2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988).
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CERCLA imposes strict liability because the plaintiff does not need to show fault on the
part of the defendant to prove liability, and proof of the defendant's care or lack of fault is
often not a defense.*^ Strict liability extends to acts of others with whom one has a contract."^
Retroactive liability means that there is no defense that the alleged liable acts or cleanup
costs incurred before CERCLA was enacted.**
^^See, George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 151, 153 (1991).
^^Id., at 154. See e.g.. United States v. Monsanto, where landowners of the site who
had a lecise agreement with the liable company were held liable as well. Also, United States
V. Bliss, where the broker between the company-producer of waste and the transporter-waste
site owner, who had a contract with both sides, was found liable as generator.
^^George W. Dent, Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 151, 154(1991).
n. THE CASE LAW UNDER CERCLA AND THE EXTENT OF LIABH^ITY
Although CERCLA expressly defines the four classes ofPRPS, it fails to be precise about
the different persons that may be included in these four classes. Not surprisingly, the question
of precisely who is a PRP has given rise to a large body of case law. As discussed below, the
review of the cases reveals that the courts have interpreted CERCLA's provisions and
Congress' intent very broadly and have found liable a number of different persons including
corporate oflBcers,^^ active stockholders,^ bankrupt estates,^^ parent corporations,^' successor
corporations,^^ current and prior landowners,^'* foreclosing lenders,'^
^"^See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem., 810 F. 2d at 742-44; New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Carolawn Co.,
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20699 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984); but also, Joslyn Corp. v.
T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La.l988), affd, 893 F. 2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
'°5ee, e.g., Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988).
'^^See, e.g., In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
''^See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1 193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Joslyn
Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James Co., 696 F. Supp. 222; United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
^^See, e.g.. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F. 2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
'^See, e.g, New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032 (2d Cir.); Tanglewood
East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F. 2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
^^See, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D.
Pa. 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573; United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F. 2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
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and lessors and lessees. '^
A. The Potentially Responsible Persons
1. Current Owners and Operators
The liability of current owners or operators exists regardless of when hazardous material
was released and regardless of whether the current owner or operator contributed to the
contamination to the property in question. As a resuh, even long after the original
contamination, a person may acquire title to property and become a PRP solely by virtue of
ownership or operation of the facility where the release occurred. ^^
"^See, e.g.. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984
(D.S.C. 1986), qffd in part, vacated in part sub nom.\ United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F. 2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Shell Oil
Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
''CERCLA defines:
"The term 'owner or operator' means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an
offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any
facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax
delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any
person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately
beforehand." 42 U.S.C.A. s 9601 (20) (A) (West Supp. 1987).
"The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity. United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C.A. s 9601
(21)(WestSuppl. 1987).
"The term 'facility' means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe
or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock,
or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer
product in consumer use or any vessel." 42 U.S.C.A. s 9601 (9) (West Supp. 1987).
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In United States v. Stringfellow,^^ the court accepted that proof of ownership of the facility
is sufficient and that CERCLA "does not require that the present owner [of a facility]
contribute to the release" from it.
As to operator liability, an operator includes one who personally supervises and controls
hazardous substance disposal activities at a site.^ In Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IJJ Int'l Corp., ^^
the court found liable the direct owners of the facility and those responsible for its operation
on a day-to-day basis.
2. Corporate Officers and Directors
A number of courts have held corporate officers liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA. ^°^
Relying on the terms of section 9607'°^ and the definition of "person" in section 9601,'°^ they
have held personally liable under CERCLA corporate officers "who are responsible for the
''661 F. Supp. 1053 (CD. Cal. 1987).
'^'^See, Barr, supra note 82, at 941.
'"^702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91(N.D. 111. 1988).
'"'5'ee.United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.Co., 810 F. 2d 726, 744 (8th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich.
1987); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v.
Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 891-95 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
'''^^See supra note 74.
'" Section 9601 (21) says: "person means an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity. United States
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body." 42 U.S.C.A. s 9601 (21).
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day-to-day operations of a hazardous waste business."'^ In most of these cases, however,
the liable officers had actively participated in the violation or were clearly negligent.
For example, in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co.,Inc.,(NEPACCO/°^ the court held personally and individually liable the president and
major shareholder of the corporation and the vice-president and supervisor of the
manufacturing plant who personally arranged for the transportation and disposal of hazardous
waste on behalf of the NEPACCO.'"^ Likewise, in United States v. Blis^°'' both the plant
supervisor and the chief executive officer were held personally liable because they had control
over their company's toxic disposal.
3. Shareholders and Parent Corporations
As a general rule, a shareholder'"* is not liable for the debts of a corporation beyond the
'"^United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 20699, 20700
(D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
'"'810 F. 2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) at 743.
'"^n the ruling the court states that the corporate officer's liability was not derivative
but personal and cites from Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F. 2d at 606 " A corporate
officer is individually liable for the torts he [or she] personally commits [on behalf of the
corporation] and cannot shield himself [or herself] behind a corporation when he [or she]
is an actual participant in the tort. The fact that an officer is acting for a corporation also
may make the corporation vicariously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior; it does not however relieve the individual of his [or her]
responsibility."
'"' 667 F. Supp. 1298,1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
' ^A shareholder may be an individual, or individuals, or another corporation, usually
the parent corporation.
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shareholder's investment in the corporation.'"' Under CERCLA, however, shareholders have
been held liable for clean up costs beyond this limit.
Some courts have said that an individual shareholder should be treated the same as a
corporate shareholder under CERCLA. ''° In New York v. Shore Realty Corp}^^ the court
found the corporate officer and shareholder who was responsible for the release of the
hazardous waste individually responsible under CERCLA for response costs as an "owner or
operator" because his stock holdings could be seen as indicia of ownership. The security
interest exemption' ^^ did not apply to the case because the stockholder had actively
participated in the management of the facility.
Also, in United States v. Northetiaire Planting Co., ''^ the court found personally liable the
defendant company president and sole shareholder who oversaw and managed day-to-day
operations and was responsible for the disposal of chemical waste for his company.
In order to establish "owner" liability for parent, or holding, and subsidiary corporations,
the court must first "pierce the corporate veil," i.e., disregard the subsidiary corporation that
directly owns the facility so as to attribute ownership of the facility to the parent. Parent
corporations are held liable as "operators" for their own conduct in relation to the operation
ofthe facility through the subsidiary. In United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,^^'* the court reasoned
that if the subsidiary is an "owner or operator" and the parent actively participates in the
^^'^See, Dent, supra note 88 at 158 (citing Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act par. 6.22; H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS par. 73, at 130-31 (3d ed.
1983)).
''""See, New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985).
'"Id.
^^^See infra, note 129.
"'670 F. Supp. 742, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
114-
*712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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management of the subsidiary while the toxic substances are being handled, the parent is also
an owner or operator. The same court also "fashion[ed] the following federal rule of decision
concerning when [to pierce] the corporate veil".'*^ Where a subsidiary is or was at the
relevant time a member of one of the classes or persons potentially liable under CERCLA; and
the parent had a substantial financial or ownership interest in the subsidiary, and the parent
corporation controls or at the relevant time controlled the management and the operations of
the subsidiary, the parent's separate corporate existence may be disregarded.''^
The response of other federal courts to this suggested rule has varied. In Joslyn
Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co.,^^^ the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
"contror'-based analysis and held that, in the absence of an express congressional directive
to the contrary, the traditional federal test applies."" The court continued "[v]e\\ piercing
[under CERCLA] should be limited to situations in which the corporate entity is used as a
sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal liability.""^
In contrast, the court in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. did not follow the Fifth
Circuit's traditional state law veil-piercing criteria'^" and affirmed the principle that, without
regard to owner liability and veil-piercing standards, a parent corporation may be held directly
liable as an "operator" of a subsidiary's facility.
'''Id. at 1202.
'''Id
'"696 F. Supp. 222 (D. La. 1988), affd 893 F 2d 80 (5th Cir. \990), petition for
cert.fded; (U.S. June 25, 1990)(No. 90-69).
"Vc/.at226.
'"Id
'^%10 F. 2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990 (petition for certiorari pending).
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4. Landowners
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by enacting SARA. Among the different changes
to CERCLA, SARA introduced the "innocent landowner defense"'^^ provision. The
provision may be invoked when the purchasers of real estate property can prove that they "did
not know and had no reason to know" ofthe existence of hazardous wastes on the site,'^^ and
that they satisfied the requirements ofCERCLA section 107(b)(3)(a) and (b), will not be held
liable for cleanup costs under the amended CERCLA statute. In order for a defendant to
prove that he did not know or have any reasons to know of the presence of hazardous
substances, the amended CERCLA introduces an all appropriate inquiry standard.'^ This
inquiry examines the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial and customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.'^"*
'"CERCLA par. 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. par. 9601(35)(B) (supp. V. 1987).
According to the added subsection, the added clause should be read in conjunction with the
third party defense of section 107(b)(3).
"'CERCLA par. 101 (35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. par. 9601 (35)(A)(i).
''^CERCLA section 101(35)(B) states the following:
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause (i)
of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the
time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of
the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability...
For a comprehensive account of the legislative history of SARA and an extended
analysis of the "innocent landowner defense" under SARA, see , Paul C. Quinn, The EPA
Guidance on Landowner Liability and the Innocent Landowner Defense: The All
Appropriate Inquiry Standard: Fact or Fiction, 2 ViLL. Envtl L.J. 143, (1991); see also,
David W. Marczely, Superfund Liability Alternativesfor the Innocent Purchaser, 39 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 79,(1991).
124
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In United States v. Monsanto Co.,^^^ Seidenberg and Hutchinson leased a four-acre tract
of land they owned to the Columbia Organic Chemical Company. Eight years later, the EPA
inspected the site and found it contaminated. Using federal funds from the Superfiind and
state fiinds, the state government performed a cleanup. Subsequently, both federal and state
governments brought action to recover response costs against the waste generators and the
owners ofthe site. The owners argued that they were not liable because "they were innocent
absentee landlords unaware of and unconnected to the waste disposal activities that took
place on their land."''^^ The court rejected their argument because CERCLA "extends hability
to owners of waste facilities regardless of their degree of participation in the subsequent
disposal ofhazardous waste. "^^^ Furthermore, the site-owners could not establish the absence
of a direct or indirect contractual relationship necessary to maintain the affirmative defense
of section 6907(b)(3) because they had a lease agreement and accepted lease payment from
the lessor. They were even found negligent for not having inspected their property during the
lease period.
5. Lenders
The issue of whether lenders may be held liable was almost completely overlooked by
Congress in drafting the CERCLA. In the definitions section, CERCLA states "[t]he term
'owner or operator'... does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
"'858 F. 2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct 3156 (1989).
''Vrf. at 166.
'^'Id at 168.
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interest in the vessel or facility."'^ looking at the legislative history, the House Report states
that the term "owner,"
does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as a financial
institution) who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or
facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing
arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or regulations.'^^
Perhaps Congress thought that the concept of "participating in the management" was so
clear that no fiirther definition was necessary. ''" Those who have sought to impose CERCLA
liability on lenders, the lenders themselves, and the courts have demonstrated, however, that
this concept is fi^aught with diflBculties. The vagueness ofthe statutory language and the lack
of legislative history have meant that the task of defining, the nature and the extent of the
liability under CERCLA has been left largely to the courts. Unfortunately the courts are
divided, with the majority concluding that lenders may be held liable for CERCLA cleanup
costs. '^' This split in the case law has created a climate of uncertainty that is particularly
troubling for those involved in transaction involving lenders.
'^**Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA establishes the so called "security exemption"
providing that:
"'owner or operator' does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility."
"'H.R. REP. NO. 172, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt 1, at 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6181.
'^"G. Van Velsor Wolf, Jr., Lender Environmental Liability Under The Federal
Superfund Program, Th Ariz. St. L.J. 531 (1991).
^^^Seee.g. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986); hut see, United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa.
Sep. 4, 1985).
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Although CERCLA's secured lender exemption was adopted in late 1980, not until
September 1985 did the first court decision explore its meaning. '^^ In United States v.
Mirabile,^^^ the court ruled that a lender that had foreclosed on a hazardous waste disposal
site and was the higher bidder at the later foreclosure sale was entitled to the protection of
the security interest exemption.
JnMirabile, American Bank and Trust Company ("AB&T") and Mellon Bank ("Mellon")
extended loans to Turco Coatings Company ("Turco"). Turco experienced financial
difficuhies and AB&T foreclosed on the paint factory at a sheriffs sale.
Several months later, the Mirabiles purchased the property. Shortly thereafter, the
Mirabiles received notice from the State of Pennsylvania that the property contained toxic
waste that needed to be removed. The Mirabiles tried to store the drums containing the
hazardous waste safely but their eflForts were inadequate. The EPA eventually cleaned up the
site at a cost of $250,000 and then sued the Mirabiles to recover costs. The Mirabiles then
joined AB&T and Mellon as third party defendants. Granting summary judgment in favor of
AB&T, the court reasoned that AB&T had only acted to protect its security interest in the
property and had not participated in the management of the site.'^'* Mellon's motion, on the
other hand, was denied because its day-to-day involvement may have made it so "overly
entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or operator of a facility" that it could be held
•^^Id
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15 Envtl. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
''Vi/. at 20996.
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liable.'" Holding secured creditors liable, including lending institutions, the court conceded,
would enhance the government's chances of recovering cleanup costs, and would help insure
more responsible management of such sites. '^^ The court explained, however, that the
decision to impose liability is a legislative one, which necessarily should lie with Congress in
the first instance.'^'
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. ("MB&T"),'^* the court found a
foreclosing lender-financial institution liable under CERCLA, breaking through the lender's
"security interest exemption" shield. MB&T, the lender, foreclosed a mortgage on a farm,
when the borrower defaulted, and later, at the sheriffs sale, purchased the property. A little
later, the EPA notified MB&T of the presence of hazardous waste on the property and
instructed it to perform a cleanup on the site. MB&T refused, so the EPA removed 2,000
tons of contaminated soil and 237 drums of contaminated waste at a cost of $552,000. The
EPA then sued MB&T for reimbursement. The court did not accept MB&T's argument for
exemption fi-om liability under the security interest exemption because MB&T was a former
mortgagee. '^^ The court ruled that it is only during the life of the mortgage that the
mortgagee holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest. Consequently,
'"M at 20995, 20997.
"V^.at 20996. Also, M. Joan Cobb, Where Will It End? Increased Risks To Lenders
Under CERCLA Secured Creditor Exemption Law, 40 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 249(1991).
'''Id
"^632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
"VJ. at 577.
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when MB&T foreclosed on its mortgage, its security interest terminated and ripened into full
title of ownership.''*'' The court continued that MB&T had foreclosed and purchased the
property "not to protect its security interest but to protect its investment."''*'
This decision was widely discussed in financial and legal circles. On one hand, the court's
analysis was attacked as faulty''*^ and narrow.''*^ Nevertheless, most commentators agree that
the time of the possession of title (four years following foreclosure and over a year prior to
cleanup where in Mirabile it was approximately four months) was a crucial factor. Another
feature ofthe MB&T case that may have influenced the court was that MB&T purchased the
property cheaply at the foreclosure sale in its contaminated condition; EPA paid for the
cleanup with public funds and the property became marketable again at the tax payer's
expense. In effect, MB&T could sell the clean property at a substantial profit without having
to pay for it.''*'*
The lending community suffered an even more severe blow with the decision in United
States V. Fleet Factors Corp}^^ Fleet Factors Corporation ("Fleet") entered into a loan
agreement with Swainsboro Print Works ("SPW"), a textile printing company. Under the
'"^See id. at 579.
'^'/J. at 579.
^^^See, King supra 23.
"*^5'ee e.g., Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 41 S. CAR. L.
REV. 705, 713(1990).
^'^Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
"'724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd, 901 F. 2d 1550 (Uth Cir. 1990), cert,
denied. 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
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financial arrangement. Fleet made a loan to SPW in return for the assignment of SPW's
accounts receivable and a security interest in the facility and all the property.'"** When SPW
went bankrupt. Fleet foreclosed on its security interest and immediately contracted with
another company to hold an auction selling the property "as is" and "in place. "'''^ Fleet did
not bid at the auction. Further, Fleet never foreclosed on nor took legal title to the debtor's
real property. Shortly thereafter, the EPA inspected the facility, found 700 drums of
hazardous toxic waste, removed forty-four truckloads of asbestos-containing material and
declared it a Superfiind site. The EPA incurred costs of nearly $400,000 in responding to the
environmental threat at SPW.
The government sought reimbursement for cleanup costs from SPW and Fleet. The
principal issue was whether Fleet had "participated in management sufficiently to incur
liability."''** The lower court refiised to grant Fleet summary judgment.'"*^ Upholding the
denial ofsummary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the participation
in "any matter" in the facility's management'^" and the participation in the "day-to-day"
management.'^' Under the rule announced by the Eleventh Circuit, a secured creditor, who
is not an operator, may be held liable under CERCLA section 107(a)(2), if the creditor
participates in the financial management of the facility to a degree indicating a "capacity to
"*/c/. at 1552.
'^^Id.
"'M at 1556.
"'Mat 1552.
'^'^e government's argument.
'^'Fleet's proposed test.
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influence" the facility's hazardous waste treatment. Under the new liability standard, "a
secured lender will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could afifect hazardous waste disposal
decisions if it so chose."'"
The appellate court analyzed Fleet's involvement with the borrower during three different
time periods: (1) Fleet's activities from the beginning of its relationship until SRW's winding
down; (2) Fleet's activities from the beginning of the winding down until the auction; and (3)
Fleet's post-auction activities. Finding Fleet liable during both the second and the third time
periods, the court went through a step-by-step analysis of CERCLA liability, including a
determination ofthe scope ofthe term "owner."'" The court found that Fleet was an owner
because Fleet held "indicia of ownership" in the facility through its deed of trust. '^'* In
addition, the court considered whether Fleet could assert the secured creditor exemption from
CERCLA owner liability. Rejecting the Mirabile standard, the court adopted a new liability
standard under which the secured creditor does not even have to participate in the
management decisions regarding hazardous wastes as long as its involvement in the
borrower's operations is "sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose."'" The court based its conclusion on the
'"/^. at 1558.
'"5'ee, Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA:
Sorting Out the Mixed Signals, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1 187 (1991) (analyzing the Fleet Factors
case).
'''Id.
'"Fleet Factors, 901 F. 2d at 1556 [5].
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following activities: Fleet required tlie borrower to seek its approval before shipping goods
to its customers; Fleet established the price for excess inventory, determined who should
receive finished goods and when they should receive them, and decided when to lay off
employees; and Fleet supervised the borrower's office administrator, controlled access to the
facility and processed the borrower's employment and tax forms. '^^ Furthermore, the court
determined that during the third period. Fleet's activities were indicative of operator status.^"
A few months afler the Fleet Factor^s decision, the Ninth Circuit issued an important ruling
concerning the scope of the secured creditor exemption in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp}^^ In
1978, the Port of St Helens ("the Port"), Oregon, entered into an agreement with Bergsoe
Metal Corp. ("Bergsoe") pursuant to which the Port agreed to issue industrial development
revenue bonds to finance the acquisition of land and construction of a lead recycling plant and
related pollution control equipment in St Helens, Oregon. In 1981, the Port, Bergsoe and the
United States Bank of Oregon ("the Bank") completed the financing for the recycling
operation. The Bank became the trustee for the bondholders and also purchased the bonds.
Initially, the Port and Bergsoe executed a sale-and-lease-back agreement, whereby the Port
received a deed to the real estate and Bergsoe made lease payments matching the bond
repayment schedule. The Port subsequently mortgaged the realty to the Bank. In short, the
Port served merely as a conduit for bond issuance and had no further involvement in the
project.
"'Mat 1559.
'''Id.
158910F. 2d668(9thCir. 1990).
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Within a year after operations began at the plant, Bergsoe defaulted under the leases. After
an unsuccessfiil workout arrangement whereby a designated management company operated
the plant, the Bank put Bergsoe into involuntary bankruptcy. Concurrently, the Oregon state
authorities found that the site was contaminated, and the Bank and the trustee in bankruptcy
filed suit against the stockholders of Bergsoe. The owners of Bergsoe's stopk filed a
counterclaim against the Bank and the Port. The Port moved for summary judgment.
The Port argued that it was protected by the secured creditor exemption, and, therefore,
was not liable under CERCLA.'^^ The court found that the Port held title to the property to
ensure that Bergsoe would meet its obligations under the leases, and thus pay off the bonds.
Therefore, the Port came within the scope of the secured interest exemption. '^° In deciding
the issue of participation in management, the court cited the Fleet Factors standard, but,
declining to establish new standards, stated "it is clear fi^om the statute that, whatever the
precise parameters of "participation," there must be some actual management of the facility
before a secured creditor will fall outside the exemption. Here, there was none, and we
therefore need not to engage in line drawing."'^' While not directly in conflict with Fleet
Factors, the Bergsoe decision appears to shift the emphasis from the lender's capacity to
control the borrower to the actual exercise of control.
'
"^See, Howard & Gerard, supra 153.
""Bergsoe, 910F. 2dat668.
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With Bergsoe, some commentators believe that the interpretation in the courts has come
almost fiill cycle back to the Mirabile analysis'^^ whether others believe that the Ninth
Circuit's decision does not appear to conflict with the Fleet Factors standard. '^^ However,
all commentators agree that "participation in management" requires actual rather than
potential activity.
B. REACTIONS AND COMMENTS
CERCLA has provoked a number of reactions among businessmen, financial institutions,
insurers, public interest groups advocates, lawyers and other professionals and has been the
favorite topic in law reviews, business and financial reviews and the general press. The reason
is not only the vague language of the law and its conflicting judicial and administrative
interpretation. The reason is the extremely high cost of the cleanup operations The EPA
tries to find the responsible person so the tax payers will not bear the cost. The PRPs are
trying to find other PRPs so they can share the cost. As a result, a long period of suing and
investigation that cost millions of dollars in legal and consultants fees, usually proceeds the
^^^See, G. Van Velsor Wolf, Jr., Lender Environmental Liability Under the Federal
SuperfUnd Program, 23 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 531, p. 7 (1991), Patricia Lynne Truscelli & Sharon
Hope Stem, Lender Liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY-ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, February 1991, Gregory P. O'Hara & William J. Hamel, Recent Developments in
Lender Liability for Environmental Cleanups under Superfund, WESTLAW, November
1990, M. Joan Cobb, Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders under CERCLA
Secured Creditor Exemption Law, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP L.249 (1991).
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See, Perkins supra note 8, at page 14, Howard & Gerard, supra note 153.
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actual cleanup. Furthermore, the hazardous waste sites have increased and are a serious treat
to the public health.
In 1986, EPA projected that it would recover seventy percent of its expenditures from
responsible parties over the duration of the fund, for a total of about $470 million.'^
Between the years 1980 through 1988,'^^ the EPA has recovered only $72.1 million of their
projected $470 million total recoupment estimate.'^
On the other hand, the hazardous waste sites are growing. In 1979, the EPA estimated
that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 hazardous waste sites existed, of which 1,200 to 2,000
presented a serious public health risk.'^^ In 1988, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
estimated that 425,380 potential hazardous waste sites existed, of which 130,000 were hkely
to be truly hazardous. '^^ The average cost for the cleanup of a waste site is $29 million not
including enforcement costs. ^^^
^^^See, Progress of the Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversite and Investigation ofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 169 at 5 (1988).
'^^Date of hearing report.
'"'Id.
'^^H.R. REP. No. 1016 (Part I & II), 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 6119, 6120. See, J. A. Maher & K. C. Hoefer, Federal
Superalien: An Alternative to Lender Liability under CERCLA, 6 JOURNAL OF LEGAL
Community 41 (1990).
'^^See, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18 at 2043 (Jan. 22, 1988).
^^"^Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Policy Research and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (Sept. 27,
1 990 )( statement of EPA's former Assistant Administrator James Strock).
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In addition, the transaction costs that accompany the cleanup costs should be taken under
consideration. According to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)'™
no precise quantitative analysis of the linkage between litigation and negotiations and
spending is possible. However, OTA estimates that 20 to 40 percent of total spending for the
Superfund program is inefficient because of prolonged negotiations and litigation between
EPA and PRPs.'^' Moreover, this figure applies only to EPA spending and not to litigation
costs between PRPs and other PRPs, PRPs and their insurers, and PRPs and citizen groups. '^^
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1. The New EPA Guidelines
On April 29, 1992, the EPA issued a final rule''^ that attempts to define the parameters of
the security interest exemption set forth in CERCLA.
The rule presents a range of activities that lenders, financial institutions and other secured
creditors may undertake to protect their security interests and still fall within the security
interest exemption. First, the rule defines "indicia of ownership" broadly to include evidence
of a security interest in real or personal property such as mortgage, deed of trust, lien, surety
'^°U.S. CONGRESS, Office of Technology Assessment, Coming Clean,
Superfund Problems Can Be Solved (Oct 1989), at 29.
'''Id.
Id. For more details, see, Hedeman, Cannon and Friedland, supra, note 3.
'^MO C.F.R. par. 300.1 100 (1992). The final rule came after EPA draft Proposal
Defining Lender Liability Issues under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA, Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1 162 (1990).
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bond, guarantee of obligation, title held pursuant to a lease-financing transaction, legal or
equitable title obtained pursuant to foreclosure, assignments, pledges, and other forms of
encumbrances against property that are held primarily to protect a security interest."'*
Second, the rule interprets the phrase "primarily to protect a security interest" to mean that
" the holder's indicia of ownership are held primarily for the purpose of securing payment or
performance of an obligation""' and, therefore, not for investment purposes.
The rule also sets forth a functional two-prong test for participation in management: A
lender is liable if it participates in the management of the borrower's operations by exercising
decisionmaking control over either the facility's environmental compliance -such as
undertaking responsibility for borrower's hazardous substance handlind or disposal practices-
or the facility's overall day-to-day operations."^ It clarifies, however, that three categories of
activities commonly undertaken by secured creditors will not be considered participation in
management; pre-loan activities, loan policing and workout activities, and foreclosures."^
TheEPA's clarification of the terms "secured creditor" and "security interest" in its final
rule relieved the financial community. However, the lender liability interpretation problems
revived with the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency. ^^^ The
"'M at 18382.
"'M at 18382-83.
'''Id.
'
'id. at 18383. However, the secured creditor must list the property for sale within
12 months of foreclosure to prove its security interest. For a complete analysis of the EPA's
final rule, see, Patricia L. Quentel, EPA Issues Long-Awaited Lender Liabilitv Rule, 22 ELR
10637(1992).
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court held that the EPA lacked the power to interpret CERCLA's sections 101(20)(A),
106(b)(2)(B) and(C) and 107(a).'''
Although the D.C. Circuit invalidated the EPA regulation, the court laid out the route for
the EPA to follow:
"We well recognize the difficulties that lenders face in the absence of the clarity EPA's
regulation would have provided. Before turning to this rulemaking, EPA sought
congressional relief and was rebuffed. We see no alternative but that EPA try again "^^'^
^^'^Id., "Congress created a safe harbor provision for secured creditors, however, in
the definition of "owner or operator," providing that "[s]uch term does not include a person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. "42 U.S.C.
9601(20)(A)." And the court continued: "Liability issues are to be decided by the court, and
therefore although EPA may well enjoy authority to issue regulations interpreting or
implementing subparagraph 106(b)(2)(D), it does not seem that Congress intended the same
authority with respect to subparagraphs 106(b)(2)(B) and (C). "Finally, the court determined
for 107(a) that the EPA has been given the "authority only to bring the question to a federal
court as the "prosecutor."
180
Id. at *27-28 (emphasis supplied).
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2. The Legislative Responses
Several bills were introduced in Congress in response to the Fleet Factors decision.'^'
Finally, in February 1994, the CHnton administration presented to Congress the Superfiind
Reform Bill.'^^ The proposal for reforming the CERCLA is the result of an extensive effort
undertaken by the EPA, the industry and environmental groups to resolve many of the
problems. The proposal is being considered by the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials.
The proposal has five primary objectives:
1) decrease the time and costs of cleanups;
2) increase the fairness of CERCLA's liability structure
and decrease litigation expenses;
3) expand state authority and involvement;
4) increase community involvement in the CERCLA process;
'^'See, e.g., H.R.2787, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989) (Congressman Weldon's
proposal defines appropriate level of due diligence that banks exercise in assessing site); S.
2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Senator Gam's proposal endeavors to protect FDIC by
exempting secured lenders); H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)(Rep. LaFalce
introduced a second version of the bill exempting fi-om liability any financial institutions,
fiduciaries or trustees who were left with contaminated property). On July 1, 1992, the
Senate voted 77 to 19 in favor of the Federal Housing Enterprises Regulatory Reform Act
of 1992, S. 2733, to which Sens. Lautenberg and Gam had attached measures to protect
municipalities and lenders ft^om CERCLA liability. The bill would normally have proceeded
to conference, but the Senate bill did not substitute S. 2733's language for the companion
House bill (H.R. 2900). Thus, the bill proceeded to, and will likely stay in the House, where
many members object to certain banking provisions in the Senate version. See, Procedural
Snags Puts up New Hurdlefor Bill Relieving Cities, Lenders, INSIDE EPA'S SUPERFUND REP.,
July 15, 1992, at 10.
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and
5) encourage economic redevelopment.
To decrease the time and costs of cleanups, the proposal would authorize the EPA to set
national generic cleanup standards for specific substances. These standards will be different
according to the use of the land involved, i.e. land used for residential purposes would be
subject to stricter standards than an industrial site. However, the proposed generic standards
would be superseded by any "more stringent" state law requirements and this may be another
source of future litigation.
To increase the fairness of CERCLA's liability structure and decrease litigation expenses,
the proposal introduces a liability scheme that would exempt from liability de micromis parties
-usually companies or municipalities that are responsible for only a relatively minuscule
portion of the contamination- by establishing cutoff levels..
ffl. FRAMEWORK OF E.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
A. Overview of E.U. Environmental Legislation
The European Union'^ is not a nation state. There is no exact comparison with the United
States, a federal state, with one federal government, one powerflil legislative body, one legal
system, one common language, one public opinion, one national television and radio. The EU
is a transnational body that sets law that is binding upon Member States and is enforced by
the European Court of Justice.'^" The twelve sovereign Member States have their own
national policy, their own budget, their own economic interests, their own legislative body,
their own language, their own history and their own different culture. It is not an easy task
to harmonize existing legislation or set common standards for all the twelve Member States^^^
It requires time and political consensus of all the twelve Member States.
'^^European Economic Community (EEC) changed the name into European Union
(EU) with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (the 'Maastricht Treaty") on
November 1, 1993.
'^^Ludwig Kramer, The European Economic Community, in UNDERSTANDING
US AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5 (Graham & Trotman/ Martinus
Nijhoff 1989).
'^^The EU Member States are France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In January
1995 three new members join the European Union: Austria, Sweden and Finland.
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The "Constitution" of the EU is the Treaty ofRome, which was signed in 1956'*^ and came
into force in 1957. Over the years, the Treaty ofRome has been amended a number of times,
including the addition of different Member states. *^^ The Single European Act ("SEA") in
1986, that came into force in 1987, constitutes the first most far-reaching amendment to the
Treaty, followed by the Treaty of Maastricht on February 7, 1992 which came into force on
November 1, 1993.
These Acts, along with the Action Programs,'** are the legal basis of Community Action.
Resolutions of the European Parliament on environmental policy are becoming increasingly
important since the Parliament is elected directly.'*^
Within the European Commission, Directorate-General XI'^° on the Environment, Nuclear
Safety and Civil Protection is responsible for preparing and implementing European Union
environmental laws and policies.'^'
Among the twelve Member States there is a different approach to environmental policy and
legislation. Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany have national environmental policies
whereas Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Belgium generally take measures for the
'*^e first six signatories were Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands.
'*^The United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Denmark in 1973, Greece in
1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986.
'**5'ee for details note 193.
'*^Since 1979. Its Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer
Protection is very active.
'"^Officially created in 1981.
^^^See, Dr. Ludwig Kramer, Focus on European Environmental Law, 1992.
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protection of the environment for the purpose of implementing in national law rules
determines by the European union. France, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg have taken
the middle ground. ^^^
The environmental concern in Europe arose in the 1970's and the first environmental
legislative acts were bom.
1. The Treaty of Rome
The Treaty that created EU and is being perceived as the Constitution of the EU does not
contain any explicit provisions for Union competence and action in the environmental field.
This is not surprising since the environment was not a prime issue in the 1950's.
The aims of the EU are set out in the Treaty of Rome, Art 2:
"The Community shall have its task, by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of the member states, to promote throughout the
Community, a harmonious development ofeconomic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and
closer relations between the states belonging to it."
In the 1970's, the environmental concern arose in the EEC It became obvious that there
cannot be economic expansion and social progress without and a better quality of life.
Realizing the importance of environmental protection, the Heads of the governments of the
Member States during their 1972 Paris meeting gave the green light to a EU environmental
policy. The first Community Action Program was adopted one year
192
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later.
''^
In its original proposal for a European environmental policy,'''* the Commission revealed
that the statement of Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome must now be taken to comprehend
environmental issues:
"To remain balanced, economic growth must henceforth be guided and controlled to a
greater degree by quality requirements. Conversely, the protection of the environment is
both guarantee of and a perquisite for a harmonious development of economic activities."
During the following years, the EU has adopted several environmental legislative acts,''^
particularly in the area of air, water, waste, toxic substances, and noise pollution.''^
The adoption of these laws has not been easy. Due to the fact that EU is a sui-generis
transnational governmental organization, the lawmaking is basically a political consensus
among the twelve sovereign Member States. The EU acts through its four institutions: the
"'O.J. C 112/20.12.1973, p.l. The First in 1973 (OJ C 112), the Second in 1977 (OJ
C 139), the Third in 1983 (OJ C 46), the Fourth in 1987 (OJ C 328) and the Fifth in 1993
(OJC 138).
'"'Bulletin EC Supplement 5/73.
'^^Three kinds of legislative acts are binding upon EU Member States: Directives,
Regulations and Decisions. The "Directive" prescribes the general requirements which a
Member State has to incorporate into its own national laws and allows for a specified time
period to implement the Directive. Each Member State can choose the suitable national
legislative act in order to meet the requirements set by the Directive. If a Member State fails
to implement the Directive, or does so inadequately, a case may be brought against it in the
European Court of Justice. The "Regulation" specifies the exact requirements with which
each member must comply and it becomes directly a national law. The "Decision" is binding
upon the particular entity- state or individual- to which it is addressed.
'^or a complete list, see Turner T. Smith, Jr., Challenges to the Private Lawyer in
Brussels: EC Environmental Regulation, ALl-ABA Course of Study in Environmental Law,
February 14-16, 1991, p. 155.
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European Commission ("Commission"),''^ the Council of the European Union ("Council")*'*,
the European Parliament"' and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")^"*'. The Commission
formulates and proposes legislation to the Council, after having obtained the comments on
the proposed legislation by the European Parliament. Once the Council adopts the law, the
Commission is responsible for its implementation by the Member states. In case of non-
compliance by a Member State, the Commission can bring an action against it in front of the
Court of Justice. In most cases, however, should the ECJ rule against the Member state, it
will have no flirther power to impose penalties. In this way, the EU is most obviously unlike
the U.S. federal system with the massive power inherent in the supremacy of the federal
701
government.
"^The Commission is led by 17 Commissioners appointed to four-year terms by the
Member States. Each Commissioner is responsible for one or more areas of Community
policy and heads one Directorate General (Department) that handles the particular
Community policy. The D.G.'s are staffed with international civil servants, nationals of the
Member States.
"^The Council is the law-making body of the EU and approves all EU policy and
legislation. Its members are representatives of the twelve Member States and
,
in contrast
with the Commission, they express their governments interests. Once the Council adopts
legislation, unanimously or by "qualified majority", all Member States are bound. Although
the Treaty provide for "qualified majority", most of the decisions have been practically taken
by unanimous vote, since Member States had agreed many years ago on the right to veto a
decision with which their national interests were conflicting. Whenever environmental
matters are at issue, the Council consists of the twelve environmental ministers.
'The European Parliament is comprised of 518 members, directly elected by the
voters in the Member States. The Parliament advises the Commission and the Council on
legislative proposals before their adoption.
^°**The European Court of Justice is comprised of thirteen Judges and six Advocate-
Generals, each appointed for six-years term by agreement among the national governments.
The Court determines the validity and interprets the Community law.
See, Bradford S. Gentry, Environmental Regulation in Europe: Hazardous Waste
and Contaminated Sites, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTL L. & BUS., 10:297 at
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The official setting for the European Union's environmental policy until now were the
Commission's Action Programs on the Environment where there are outlined the intentions
for legislation and other activities in the years ahead that appeared under the form of
numerous Directives.
The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty incorporated in the treaty the EU environmental
policy.
2. The Single European Act
The Single European Act ("SEA")^*^" amended the original EU Treaty and added Title VII
(Articles 130R-130T), exclusively devoted to the environment, as well as article 100a that
provides the European Union with a firm jurisdictional base for adoption of environmental
laws.^°^ The EU environmental legislation is basically under the form of Directives and
Regulations that must derive their authority from one or more articles of the Treaty of Rome.
Since the treaty was amended by the Single European Act, environmental Directives have
generally been based on either Article 100a, which deals with harmonization relating to the
establishment of the Single Market, or the "environmental" Article 130s. On several
occasions the choice of the legal basis has led to disputes between the Commission and the
402(1990).
^"'O.J. L. 169 (adopted late 1985; effective July 1, 1987)
203Under the SEA, "qualified majority" applies in most of the decision making and
the Parliament's role in the lawmaking process has been significantly strengthened, through
the "cooperation procedure" that allows a majority of the Parliament to propose amendments
in a "second reading" after the Council has adopted a "common position."
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Council In 1991, the ECJ recognized Article 100a as the correct legal basis of the 1989
Directive on waste from the titanium dioxide industn,' but, in a more recent case, the Court
favors Article 130s.-'"
The significance of the choice of the legal basis lies mainly in the difference in the
procedures required for adoption of legislation. Under article 100a, the Council may adopt
legislation by qualified majority voting, and the European Parliament also has considerable
powers to influence the content of legislative proposals through the so-called "co-operation
procedure." In contrast, legislation based on .Article 130s must be adopted by unanimit}-, and
European Parliament's role is essentially hmited to one of consultation one Furthermore,
while it is clear that individual Member states may introduce stricter environmental standards
w^here legislation is based on .Article 130s, their ability to do so under .Article 100a is more
restricted.-*^'
3. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union
The Maastricht Treat)-^ has built upon the SEA in establishing environmental protection
as a basic element in the EU legal order .Anicle 2 of the Treaty of the European Union
commits the European Union to promote "sustainable and non-inflationar\' grovvih respecting
-^Case C- 155/91, decision of the European Court 17 March 1993.
-''The ENDS Report, No 221, June 1993, p. 44.
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the environment." The new article 130s states that environmental policy "must be integrated
into the definition and implementation of other Community policies."
The procedure of adopting environmental legislative acts has also changed in the
Maastricht. The requirement for unanimity at the Council of the Union level has been
replaced by the "qualified majority" voting, and the new "cooperation procedure" is in efifect
at the European Parliament.^ The "co-decision" procedure,^"* granting an effective right of
veto to the European Parliament, will be used for the formulation of the European Union's
priorities in general environmental action programs and for harmonizing or "single-market"
measures. Finally, the unanimity rule will continue to apply only to environmental measures
of fiscal nature, measures relating to town and country planning, land use (with the exemption
ofwaste management and measures of a general nature), the management of water resources
and energy supply. '^"^ In fiiture most measures should, therefore, be adopted by qualified
majority voting. This should prevent legislation being blocked by a single Member state but
it will probably slow down the enactment of legislation.
Although the "polluter-pays" principle has a dominant position in the European
environmental policy, a financial support is necessary to achieve the goal of a cleaner Europe.
For that reason there are several Community Funds financing environmental projects in the
Member states: the European Social Fund, the "orientation" section of the European Fund
for Orientation and Agricultural Guaranty and, most important, the European Fund for
^°^01d Article 130s replaced by new Article 189c.
^"^Old Article lOOA replaced by new Article 189b.
'"'^ew Article 130S(2).
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Regional Development. The new Cohesion Fund, which is intended to run from 1993-1999,
provides financial assistance^"' for environmental projects and for trans-European networks.
This fiind operates parallel to the existing Structural Funds with a view toward increasing
cohesion between the different regions of the European Union. The Council is able to grant
temporary derogations and financial support from the new Cohesion Fund if a Member state
incurs disproportionate costs when implementing certain measures.
The Maastricht Treaty has also attached a renewed emphasis on the principle of
subsidiarity as established by the SEA. The Treaty now states that decisions should be taken
as closely as possible to citizens. Therefore, the European Union will continue to act in
environmental matters only where the Union's objectives can be better attained through joint
action at the Community level rather than throughout the individual efforts of the Member
States. The subsidiarity question still remains slightly vague and some European governments
react to it because it is not clear who is going to determine why and what environmental
matter will be decided on a Union level rather than a national level.
B. Environmental Hazardous Waste Legislation and Civil Liability in the E.U.
At present, EU legislation does not provide any legal rules for general environmental
liability.
^"^e Fund has been established to help the EU's poorest members -Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Spain and some poor regions of other Member States- to bring their economies
in line with the convergence criteria required for Economic and Monetary Union.
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There is only the Commission's first attempted in 1989"" to implement the "polluter pays"
principle in the environmental liability field proposing a Directive on civil liability for damage
caused by waste and the publication of the Green Paper in 1 993 .-'" Reactions fi-om European
and foreign industrv' operating in Europe*'^ plus fijndamentaJ reservations expressed by
several Member States caused both mitiative to be taken ofif Council's pnonty list, and a
major Commission rethink of the issues was started
Quite apart from the EC proposal the Council of Europe Convention that imposes strict
liability on operators of a wide range of dangerous activities" '* for damage caused to the
environment, was formally adopted on 8 March 1993 The Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment was approved bv the
Committee ofMinisters of the Council of Europe, which numbers 26 members, including the
12 EU Member states.
"
'Proposal for a Council Directive on civil liabilirs for damage caused by waste. O.J.
C 251/3, 4.10.89. its Explanatorv Memorandum COM(89') 282 finaf- S^'N 21",' 15.9.89 and
its revised Proposal of 23 July 1991. O.J. C 192. p. 6.
~^'See infra, note 218.
'i.e. Andre Hellebuyck. representative of ICC. Address at the International
Colloquium on Environmental Liability and Financial Security (June 22. 1 992 )( transcript
available from the International Chamber oi Commerce in Paris)! "We will have ample
opportunity to discuss the US situation and the dismal results it generated over the last
decade.")
" *Such as the handling, storage, use and discharge oi dangerous substances, the
production, culuinng. handling, storage, use. destruction, disposal, release or any operation
dealing with genetically-modified organisms and the operation of an installation or site for
the incineration, handling or recycling of waste (an. 2( l)(a-c) and Annex II.
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National legislation is another consideration. Under the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty
Member States will be free to adopt stricter measures than the European legislation.^'' The
existing national laws on civil liability for environmental damage vary among the Member
States. Some Member States have enacted specific legislation to establish a system of
environmental civil liability; others rely on civil code provisions or common law principles as
basis for such liability. ^'^ While environmental liability is based on fault in most countries,
strict liability based merely on land ownership exist in some countries.'^'^
218
1. The Proposed Directive On Civil liability For Damage Caused by Waste
The four-pages text favors strict liability and the "polluter pays" principle. The proposal
applies to all wastes generated in the course of economic activities. The proposal does not
apply to nuclear wastes and contaminations^'^ or wastes and pollution due to hydrocarbons^^"
nor to domestic wastes. "Waste" is defined broadly with reference to Directive 75/442 on
^'^EU Treaty, Art. 100a(4) in conjunction with art. 130t that states that "measures
adopted [under a rule of unanimity] shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining
or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty".
^^^See, Turner T. Smith, note 196, at p. 172.
'''Id.
'^^See, supra note 211.
^'^uclear waste is being covered by the Paris Convention on Civil Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris, 29 July 1960) and the complementary convention to the
latter (Brussels, 31 January 1963).
^^ese are covered by the "International Agreement on the Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution" (Brussels, 29 November 1969) and the "International Agreement for the Creation
of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Damages" (Brussels, 18 December 1971).
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The damage to the environment, that is changes in water, soil or air conditions, must be
"major and persistent". The Directive requires restoration and excludes imposition of punitive
damages. Only public authorities and public interest groups, where national laws so provide,
have the right to bring legal action.^^^ The plaintiff has the burden of proof in contrast with
the national legislation of the Member states.
The proposal includes a time-bar of three years from the time when the damage occurred
and of 30 years after the event which gave rise to the damage. Despite the Commission's
intention to expressly prohibit retroactivity, the wording of article 13^^ provoke reactions
among EU associations and commentators. The reason for that being the use of the term
"incident" and its interpretation. ^^''
As for the insurance, the proposal leaves up to the court to limit liability where appropriate
^'Council Directive on waste 75/442/EEC, O.J. L 194/39, 25.7.75. The meaning of
"waste" in the Directive is close to the meaning of "hazardous substances" in CERCLA.
However, it is not yet clear whether the Member States implementing the Directive will
attempt to put their own legislative gloss on the definition of waste. See, George Clemon
Freeman, Jr. & Kyle McSlarrow, The Proposed European Community Directive On Civil
Liability For Waste - The Implications For U.S. Superfund Reauthorization in 1991, THE
BUSINESS LAWYER, Vol. 46 (1990).
^^^Art. 4 (3) and (4) od the Directive.
"This Directive shall not apply to damage or injury to the environment arising
from an incident which occurred before the date on which its provisions are implemented".
^^Seealso, Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 214 and Michael Scott Feeley, Peter
M. Gilhuly & Reginald K. S. Ammons, W(h)ither Goes the EC Proposed Directive on Civil
Liabilityfor Waste, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241 (1992).
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2. The Green Paper
On March 17, 1993, after more than a year of internal debate, the European Commission
published the long awaited for "Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage. "^^^ The
Green Paper raise issues but does not determine them. Although strict liability is favored, the
scope of liability is still open. The definition of damage to the environment remained
undetermined^^^ and a system of compensation where the no-fault arrangements cannot be
applied is being introduced.
Questions relating to insurance are also left open, but the discussion is more extensive than
in previous drafts.
Relatively little is said about enforcement issues, or about the experiences with different
liability regimes, although literally everybody in Europe is making references to the
"Superfijnd" and its inefficiency.
The reactions were more hostile than those to the earlier draft directive on civil liability for
damage caused by waste which was dropped within a few weeks of the revised draft coming
225COM (93) 47 provisional version ("The Green Paper").
^n civil law - that governs most of the Member States - damage is defined as any
material or moral damage sustained by a person as a result of the activities of a third party.
This still leaves the question open of whether any impairment of aspects of the environment
that are inappropriate and cannot be appropriates, such as the sea or the athnosphere, can be
described as damage. The Green Paper is using the term "damage" to describe any
impairment of the environment, as such, irrespective of its impact on people and property.
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out. However, the Council ofEuropean Convention on civil liability for damage caused by
waste has already signed by several EU countries. ^^^
a. Overview
The Introduction explains the necessity of the Green Paper, a preparatory document for
a future legislative act, on remedying environmental damage. Part two deals with liability,
liable parties, the definition of environmental damage, the right to bring legal action, the
question of adequate remedy, and the problem of insurability. There are also references to
national and international trends in the law on environmental liability. Part three deals with
the actual remedy: requiring restoration, allocating the cost and maintaining a preventive
effect. Solutions adopted at international and national levels are also discussed. Finally, part
four evokes possible directions for Union action. Annex I presents the trends at Member
State level. Annex n comments on the situation in non-Member States, particularly in Japan
and the US, annex III gives a list of international conventions on civil liability and
compensations and, finally, annex IV gives a summary of the Council of Europe Convention
on civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment and poses
the question whether the European Union should adopt the Convention or merely select
material fi-om it for a separate EU initiative.
^^^By June 21, 1993, four EU Member states had signed the Convention: Greece,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. Belgium intends to do so, while Germany, the U.K.
Ireland and Denmark are still opposed to ratifying the Convention. The European Union
also took part in the negotiations, however, it is unlikely that the Union as a whole can
become a signatory. The effect of ratification by some Member States would certainly
exacerbate existing national divergences.
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b. The Liability Question
After careful consideration ofboth approaches to civil liability, that is fault-based and strict
liability, the Green Paper clearly demonstrates the merits of strict as opposed to fault-based
liability on the grounds that strict liability increases incentives for better risk management. ^^*
However, the scope of the liability regime and limitation of liability are left open. A
noticeable ommission is treatment of the concerns of lenders and other financial institutions. ^^^
As for the "joint" or "join-and-several" liability, the Commission, after examining the
possible implications of both, opts for the "channelling liability" regime. "^^
The Green Paper suggests that a liability system will only be usefiil in the case of specific
incidents of damage involving identifiable parties. ^^' In other situations, for example, in the
case of gradual or past pollution, or where polluting emissions have been authorized, it
recommends some form ofjoint compensation fund. Contributions would be sought from the
economic sector most closely Unked to the type of damage in question, and funds be
^^^Article 2. 1 . 1. and 2. 1 .2 and articles 4. 1 . 1 and 4. 1 .2.
^^^In September 3, 1993, the Danish Environmental Agency tried for the first time
to hold a bank responsible for environmental damage caused by one of its clients. The bank,
with the backing of the Danish Council of Finance, held successfully that as a lender, a bank
cannot be held responsible for environmental damage caused by its clients, and that the
situation would be different only if the bank owned parts of the company. {See,
Environment Watch - Western Europe, Vol. 2, No. 17, 3 September 1993).
^e Green Paper Art. 2. 1 .3. The Green Paper also makes references to the same
system adopted by International Convention (art. 2.2.2).
"'M Art. 2.1.5.
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designated specifically for a cleanup. This would ensure a speedy response in he event of
sudden disasters. Once again the Commission does not favor retroactivity but the Green
Paper's wording is not very clear.^^
3. EU Legislation and National Laws
The Green Paper in its Annex I gives a list of national legislation ofMember States with
the comment that " liability should be established without fault".
Belgium : Law of 22 February 1974 on toxic waste, which holds the generator of toxic
waste strictly liable for damage caused by that waste.
Royal Decree of 16 October 1981 on the control of organisms harmful to plants and plant
products, which holds the owner of the land on which such organisms originate liable for any
damage caused by their spread.
France : Law of 15 July 1975 on waste, which states that any party transferring certain
waste elsewhere than to the operator ofan authorized disposal plant shall be strictly liable for
any damage caused by that waste.
Greece : Framework Law No 1650 of 1986 on environmental protection which provides
that any natural person who or legal person which causes pollution or deterioration to the
environment shall be strictly liable for that damage.
^^Id. Art. 2.1.5 (III) "Sometimes the damage is ft-om so far back intime that no liable
party is identifiable. Sometimes the party can be identified but is not liable, because liability
was not established when the damage occured. Or the party may be ifentifiable, liable, but
insolvent."
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United Kingdom : Environmental Protection Act 1990 which lays down strict liability
rules for damage resulting from the illegal disposal of waste.
Portugal: Basic Law on the Environment No 1 1/1987 which provides for strict liability
for significant damage to the environment caused by a dangerous activity.
Germany : Water Resources Act 1960 which holds the author of an unauthorized pollution
of water strictly liable for any damage caused.
Law on Environmental Liability 1990 which provides for a comprehensive system of strict
liabihty for the operation of industrial facilities which present a risk to the environment.
C. Reactions and Comments
The European Commission invited all interested parties to submit their comments on the
Green Paper by October 1993. During the six-month consultation period the Commission
received comments fi^om 100 bodies but only one Member State, the United Kingdom. In
addition, on 3-4 November
, 1993, the European Commission and the European Parliament
held a joint hearing to discuss the establishment of a European environmental liability regime.
Among the participants were representatives of industry, insurers, banks, environmental
groups and environmental lawyers.
The positions adopted by the interested parties are largely predictable. Industry and
employers are broadly hostile to the idea of a strict liability regime, rejecting joint and several
liability, providing a wide range of defenses, and avoiding compulsory insurance. In their
view, the burden of establishing a causal link should stay with the victim, liability should not
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be channeled (joint or joint and several), environmental groups should not have the right to
start an action, and lenders should not be held liable. Finally, they believe that restoration
should only be ordered on a fitness-for purpose basis, taking into account the future use of
the environment concerned and that past pollution should only be cleaned up wore it poses
a significant risk to public health and the cost should be borne by society at large. On the
other hand, environmental groups favor the strictest liability regime and retroactivity, believe
that public interest groups should have standing, advocate a wide scope of liability, and, favor
a joint compensation fund financed in accordance with the "polluter pays" principle and
enabling prompt restoration of the environment. The debate is still open.
CONCLUSION
The abundant EU and Member States' environmental laws, the different approaches of the
national governments, and the conflicting interests of the different groups have put both the
Proposed Directive and the Green Paper on hold. With the other social, economic and
institutional problems existing in the European Union today, the civil liability for damage
caused to the environment by hazardous waste does not seen to be a top priority for the
political leaders. However, the question cannot remain in a legislative limbo for long and the
EU institution should soon have to face the problem and find the golden compromise.
The U.S. experience, that is legislation and extensive case-law, can be a far more constructive
lesson than simple references made by literally everybody in Europe. It is clear that the
European leaders want an economically strong and competitive Europe and, therefore, they
will avoid any measure that could hurt the European business On the other hand, the Treaty
on European Union and the Environmental Programs as well as the social demand calls for
a clean and safe environment, and, therefore, the responsible parties have to bear the cost
clear wording. This is difficult because the legislators -politicians trying to please everybody -
are knov^ for their penchant for general wording and unclear intention. Moreover, there are
the distinct differences among the national legislation and public sensibility towards the
environment that exist in the different Member States. As long as the national governments
have the legislative power to approve European policy and legislation as the Council of the
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European Union, it is practically impossible to think and act as European leaders and not as
national politicians expressing their national government's voice That will eventually change
with the switch of the legislative power to the European Parliament in the future.
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